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INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN IN NETWORKS
Elaborating and analysing strategies 
for institutional design
There has been a lot of attention to governance in networks lately. Given the assumption that actors are 
dependent on each other empirical and theoretical research has been done how actors interact with each 
other how complex decision processes take place and how these processes can be managed (Rhodes, 1997; 
Kickert -  Klijn -  Koppenjan, 1997; Marsh, 1998; Mandell, 2001). In these publications a lot of attention 
has been paid to the difference in perceptions between actors, their various interests and their conflicting 
strategies. The institutional features of networks however have received only limited attention. Most of the 
attention has been on the interaction patterns between actors. These analysis however have rarely been 
connected to the question how we can manage network characteristics and what limitations we face here. 
This in spite of the fact, that in practice we encounter a lot of attempts to change institutional features of 
networks. In this paper we focus on the institutional characteristics of networks.
Governments all over the world and especially in 
Western democracies search for new forms of 
governance or try to induce these by restructuring 
decision making, changing their relations with other 
public and private partners or a combination of the 
two. Examples of these strategies in which insti­
tutional changes in decision-making and organisation 
are initiated are the ideas of joint-up government in the 
UK but also the introduction of the Private Finance 
Initiative and the attempts at modernising local 
government in this country. But also the initiatives for 
creating more autonomous governmental organisa­
tions in many western countries (Pollitt et al, 2001) 
can be seen at attempts for achieving institutional 
changes. Obvious governments in western 
democracies see interventions of institutional design 
in which institutional characteristics in networks are 
changed as legitimate and effective means of 
governance.
Although in the theoretical approaches to policy 
networks the subjects of institutional arrangements 
and their design have been addressed, the way in
which they are dealt with has not been entirely 
satisfactory. In the more structuralist oriented variants 
on the network approach a great deal of energy is 
expended on mapping the structural characteristics of 
networks and their formation. However, until now the 
connection between institutional characteristic of 
networks and the behaviour of actors in the policy 
games which are played within these networks is 
hardly made (Blom -  Hansen, 1997).
The network approach inspired by the qualitative 
games approach, on the other hand, focuses primarily 
on analysing the development and the outcome of 
interaction processes (policy games) between 
mutually dependent parties in order to find out what 
consequences these might have for the design and 
management of these processes. Although mutual 
dependencies form the impetus for striving for 
interaction, up to now there has been insufficient focus 
on the institutional characteristics of networks in this 
approach. This is in spite of the fact that in the context 
of the discussion on network management strategies, 
network formation and network change strategies are 
often mentioned. Since the relationship between
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)n network institutions and behaviours in interaction 
tq processes has barely been looked into, these mana- 
>3 gement concepts remain rather sketchy.
\ \  Hesitations regarding institutional design
In addition, modifying network structures is viewed 
w with some wariness in the network approach. 
14 Primarily because there is a fear that attempts to 
m modify institutional conditions under which actors 
ni interact are motivated by attempts to solve specific 
iq problems or promote specific interests, whereas 
3n networks are multi-purpose vehicles which are 
ni intended to support interaction on tackling a wide 
ßi range of problems and interests of various parties, 
ni Institutional interventions may thus lose out to the 
nJ tackling of other problems and interests and a whole 
ßi range of unexpected and undesired effects may result 
I) (De Bruijn -  Ten Heuvelhof, 1997). Moreover, 
m network relationships may be seen as institutional 
bo capital: they are the lasting learning effects of long- 
o} term interaction processes in which mutually 
ab dependent parties with opposing interests have found 
w ways in which to regulate their mutual social 
nj transactions and to coordinate their processes and 
iq products. Institutional interventions remove these 
K9  existing institutional structures and replace them with 
3n new ones whose efficacy is uncertain. Institutional 
ni innovation and destruction of institutional capital go 
ni hand in hand: reverting to old institutions if the results 
iß are disappointing is not usually possible. This risk is 
ui further reinforced by the meagre knowledge we have 
iß about the nature and functioning of network 
ni institutions and the effects that institutional 
ni interventions bring about.
ft The relevance of institutional design
There are at least two reasons why this hesitation 
w with regard to institutional design cannot be 
m maintained.
.1 1. This hesitation overlooks the fact that network
institutions not only enable and reinforce 
interaction between mutually dependent parties, 
but that they also generate undesired effects. They 
may screen interactions from the outside world, 
whereby a limited group profits from the 
collaborative benefits, weak and unrepresented 
groups are excluded, costs are passed on to others, 
innovative solutions which conflict with vested 
interests and preferences are blocked. Moreover, 
interactions in networks are often characterised by 
non-transparent processes, inadequate democratic V
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controls and restricted external legitimacy (Marsch 
— Rhodes, 1992; Marin -  Mayntz, 1991; Kickert -  
Klijn -  Koppenjan, 1997). One should also bear in 
mind that institutional arrangements in themselves 
have a preservative function. Since institutions are 
formed slowly and are difficult to change, they may 
be superseded by new social developments. Instead 
of providing institutional solutions they instead 
often become part of the problem. Of course, this 
dark side of networks can be addressed by trying to 
improve the quality of interaction processes within 
networks. Where network institutions systema­
tically lead to inadequate care being taken of the 
interests of social groups and structurally exclude 
certain problems from the arenas for social problem 
solution, however, attempts to modify network 
characteristics through institutional design appear 
to offer a more structural and appropriate solution. 
2. The hesitation in network theory with regard to 
institutional design overlooks the fact that in policy 
practice, as was mentioned in the opening of this 
paper, there is not the least restraint in this respect. 
There are masses of initiatives aimed at 
reorganisations, systems reforms, modifications of 
institutional frameworks, privatisation and 
liberalisation, or the introduction of public 
management inspired management systems, 
etcetera. These interventions have significant 
implications for existing networks and the 
interactions between interdependent parties within 
these networks. We have the distinct impression 
that many of the attempts to achieve institutional 
design do not do sufficient justice to the nature of 
the mutual dependencies between actors in our 
network society with the result that they not only do 
not bring about the intended results, but that they 
are often even counterproductive. They require 
substantial investments, bring about unexpected 
and undesired effects and tend to hamper rather 
than support interactions between parties.
These two reasons provide strong grounds for 
devoting more attention to the subject of institutional 
design, both as regards empirical research and theory 
building. The goal should be to increase our insight 
into institutional design in network settings in order to 
improve the quality of these interventions. To this end, 
more empirical insight is needed into the content and 
effects of institutional design attempts. In addition, the 
normative and theoretical principles which underlie 
institutional design need to be better thought out. In
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this paper, we will try to give an initial impetus to this 
using a network approach (Klijn -  Koppenjan, 2000; 
Koppenjan -  Klijn, 2004) -  building on insights from 
neo-institutional economics and the new 
institutionalism in social sciences (Williamson, 1985; 
Nooteboom et al, 1997; North, 1990; March -  Olsen, 
1989; Ostrom et al, 1986; Powel -  DiMaggio, 1991). 
We first deal with the idea of networks as institutions 
and the role of rules. We then discuss the forms of 
institutional design and their motives (section 3) and 
various strategies of institutional design (section 4). In 
section 5 we elaborate on the complex character of 
institutional design since these interventions have to 
be achieved in games. In section 6 we address 
normative questions: what is ‘good institutional 
design’. Since we conclude that theory building and 
research in the field of institutional design is not very 
well developed, we end with a sketch of a research 
agenda (section 7).
Networks as Institutions: 
rules and their structuring
Institutions actually form the social infrastructure 
of our behaviour. Without institutions virtually every 
form of collective behaviour would be impossible. If 
we were not able to fall back on fixed rules, norms and 
agreements which give our behaviour meaning, 
collective behaviour would be virtually impossible due 
to the considerable transaction costs. Institutions thus 
often provide a source of stability and comprise the 
social capital which has formed actors in the past. This 
means not only that they are useful for determining 
behaviour and provide a handle for cooperation but 
also that they are difficult to change because they 
contain carry the bias of previous interactions, views 
and power relations. Institutions are thus a two-edged 
sword: they enable interactions, provide stability and 
certainty and form the basis on which actors’ trust may 
be founded. At the same time they serve to ‘codify’ 
previous (unequal) power relations, of common 
opinions and permitted discussions and may thus 
obstruct or hamper reforms.
Rules as the heart of institutions: ambiguity, 
formation and change
Rules form the heart of institutions. Many authors 
even consider rules as the characteristic of institutions. 
For instance, Scharpf (1997: 38) describes institutions 
as „systems of rules that structure the course of actions 
that a set of actors may choose”. Institutions are thus
in short sets of rules which influence, guide and limit 
the behaviour of actors. In this sense networks may 
thus be regarded as institutions. They are not only pat­
terns of social relationships between mutually depen­
dent actors but are at the same time systems of rules.
Networks are characterised after all by specific and 
unique sets of formal and informal rules. Each network 
has its own history, in the course of which rules have 
been formed and these in turn have undergone a 
development. In short, each network distinguishes 
itself from a different network not only because of the 
actors who are part of it and the interactions which 
take place in it but also because of its own specific set 
of rules (Burns -  Flam, 1997; Scharpf, 1997; Klijn, 
1996; 2001).
The rules of the network are as it were ‘activated’ 
by the actors in separate games. This does not mean, 
however, that rules are always clear or even fully 
known to the interacting actors. Rules are often 
ambiguous and require translation in the interactions. 
Just as a judge tries to interpret a specific case (offen­
ce) in the light of an existing rule, an actor in the 
network tries to interpret the meaning of events in the 
game based on the network rules that he is familiar 
with.
The fact that network rules are activated in the 
game also explains why difficulties frequently arise in 
games which cover more than one network. In games 
of this sort, after all, different rules from different 
networks are activated which leads at the very least to 
ambiguity (which rules apply and how should they be 
interpreted) but may also lead to conflicts between 
different sets of rules (Van Bueren et al., 2003). The 
behaviour of actors in such situations often consists at 
least in part of determining and reaching consensus on 
the rules that will apply.
Although there are occasions when rules are 
consciously formed in games which have been entered 
into for that purpose, establishing laws e.g., rules are 
usually formed as a by-product during interactions. In 
other words, rules may be the product of conscious 
design behaviour by an actor -  usually a public actor -  
but even then they are only rules if the other actors in 
the network recognise them as such and keep to them. 
This immediately provides a definition of the essential 
difference between social and physical rules. Social 
rules, and thus also rules in networks, only remain in 
existence if they are followed by actors and are 
actually complied with in concrete game behaviours.
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Rules which are broken by the actors, either 
consciously or unconsciously, or are not (or no longer) 
complied with, lose their validity (Duintjer, 1977; 
Bums -  Flam, 1997).
This also clarifies under which conditions rules 
may change.
-  As a result of a conscious action (design/inter- 
vention) by an actor provided that this intervention 
is perceived to be legitimate by other actors in the 
network and is at least complied with. (Note that 
this is not necessarily in a literal sense. We will 
return to this later.)
-  Asa result of reinterpretation by actors; if a number 
of actors start to interpret existing rules in a diffe­
rent way (in terms of our example of the judge we 
could say: create a different jurisprudence) rules 
will change.
-  As a result of non-compliance or even conscious 
breaking of rules; if actors no longer comply with 
rules or even consciously break them and this 
stance is adopted by other actors and not followed 
up by effective negative sanctions, rules will lose 
their meaning. This process will usually be 
accompanied by the simultaneous formation of new 
rules (see Van Buuren -  Klijn, 2004).
Sorts of rules:
Rules are thus usually gradually formed and also 
gradually changed. The following question, however, 
is what it is exactly that they regulate in networks and 
how they can be analysed. To put it another way, what 
types of rules are found in networks. In the literature 
we find various classifications into types of rules (see, 
for example, Ostrom, 1986; Burns -  Flam, 1987). A 
well-known distinction is the one made by Ostrom 
(1986, see also Kiser -  Ostrom, 1982):
-  position rules; rules which specify the positions of 
actors
-  entry and exit rules; rules which regulate the way in 
which the actors acquire positions
-  scope rules: rules which relate to the sort of matters 
which are dealt with in a network
-  authority rules: rules which clarify what is 
permitted in a particular position
-  aggregation rules: these are the rules that regulate 
the division of decision making functions and indi­
cate how sub decisions are integrated
-  information rules: rules which specify the com­
munication channels but also the language and
form of the messages that are transmitted via the
communication channels 
-  pay-off rules: these regulate actors’ revenue.
Although Ostrom’s classification is certainly useful 
and has provided a partial inspiration here, it has not 
been adhered to in its entirety. An important reason is 
that in this classification a number of important 
categories of rules are ignored, namely rules which 
determine the identity of actors and their professional 
standards, etc. This is partly due to the fact that 
Ostrom’s system of rules is strongly based on an 
economic perspective in which rules are primarily laid 
down explicitly in games between actors.
In order to make a clearer distinction between 
structuring and regulating rules (see Searle, 1971; 
Duintjer, 1977) we assume a distinction between arena 
rules and interaction rules. Arena rules are rules which 
provide the actors with a handle for determining the 
nature of the network and arena in which they find 
themselves. They specify positions, realities and pay­
offs. They are thus rules which define the nature of a 
social practice. As such they are at times barely 
recognisable as rules and sometimes are of an almost 
tautological character. The rules have somewhat the 
character of what Searle, the English analytical 
philosopher, calls structuring rules (van Eemeren -  
Koning, 1981; Searle, 1971). A structuring rule, for 
example, is one which defines when someone in a 
chess game has been placed in checkmate. Checkmate 
is when he is unable to make a move to get himself out 
of check. These are thus rules which define the nature 
of the game.
Interaction rules have a more procedural character 
and tell actors what is and is not permitted within a 
network. They modify as it were behaviours within the 
context of the arena rules. An overview of the two 
types of rules and examples can be found in Table 1.
Interaction rules may focus on the access to the 
network or the arena or on the interactions within the 
game. Access rules determine how exclusive games 
are, how actors are selected for particular games and 
which exit options they have. A non-intervention rule 
is a clear example of an interaction rule similar to rules 
about what information is made available and rules for 
dealing with conflict.
Within arena rules three subsets of rules may be 
identified: reality rules, pay-off rules and position 
rules. Reality rules specify primarily what constitutes 
good and bad arguments, information and standards
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Table 1.
Types of rules in networks
Description Aspects Examples
Interaction rules Rules which regulate interactions in the 
game;
i.e. Rules which specify what is and is 
not perm itted in games between actors
Access to policy game -  exclusivity
-  selection
-  exit options
Interaction in policy game -(non) intervention 
-provision o f information 
-conflict
Arena rules Rules which regulate the game setting; 
i.e. Rules which specify what type of 
game and network is under discussion 
in any given case






Source: Klijn, 1996, 2001
for actors. Professional codes regarding behaviour 
(e.g. physicians) or products (e.g. good-quality 
housing) play an important role here. In addition, arena 
rules relate to which pay-off rules (financial but also 
non-material) and which position rules in the network 
are important.
Network characteristics and rules: some examples 
Rules are thus also a codifying of specific 
characteristics of networks which are frequently 
emphasised in the literature. They determine such 
characteristics as:
-  Closedness of networks; closedness of networks is 
regulated by the interaction rules on the one hand 
which determine which actors are admitted into 
games in the networks. These may be formal rules 
(which regulate consultation, for example) but may 
also be informal rules. However, closedness is also 
determined by other rules. The product rules may 
be so specific and complicated that considerable 
knowledge is needed to master them. This does not 
refer to a closedness that is more or less conscious 
but closedness as a result of high entry costs.
Closedness may also be the result of the fact that, 
due to the identity and product rules, certain 
problem formulations and/or solutions are simply 
not taken into consideration. This also touches on 
the power dimension as we shall see below.
-  The language which is used in the networks; It is 
often emphasised that in networks, particularly 
those of a sectoral character, specific modes of
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expression, terminology and jargon are used that 
may cause misunderstandings. This chiefly relates 
to the identity and product rules which apply in 
networks. These may very strictly regulate what 
constitute quality products and services, which 
quality requirements are considered standard and 
thus how communication occurs regarding, for 
example, solutions or problems.
-  The power and resource dependence in networks; 
Power is in essence the perception by other actors 
in the network of another actor’s influencing 
potential. This perception is regulated by position 
rules which determine whether or not an actor is 
respected. But they are also determined by what is 
permitted in a network. In short, they are also partly 
dependent on the access options (which actors may, 
consciously or unconsciously, be excluded) and the 
mode of communicating about (policy) issues. 
Thus, on the product and identity rules of the 
network. This last dimension of power is usually 
referred to as mobilisation of bias (Barach -  Baratz, 
1962). Through an analysis of these dimensions of 
the network via rules an insight may also be gained 
into this grimmer side of institutions (Moe, 1990; 
Knight, 1992).
The last observation about power draws attention to 
the fact that the structure of the network, the sets of 
rules, is made up of interactions and choices from the 
past and thus also of the power relations from the past. 
A struggle about changing rules, and that means for 
each attempt at institutional design, is also (but not
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>8 solely!) a power struggle (see Klijn, 2001). In addition 
P to enabling and facilitating interactions by reducing 
is strategic uncertainty and transaction costs, network 
ii institutions thus also have a ‘dark’ side: the institutio- 
;n nalisation of distributive advantages and the exclusion 
to of certain actors, interests and issues. Institutions are 
rli thus not neutral. The simultaneously fulfil both a 
>q positive and a negative function: they effect a stable 
ni interaction environment but also bring about non­
ib decision making and mobilization of bias. Whenever 
ni institutions fall short in the first function or become 
;b dysfunctional due to the second, there are grounds for 
ni institutional design.
N  What is institutional design? Forms and motives
Networks as institutions thus support the realisation 
lo of collective benefits and the (re)distribution of these 
id benefits. The way in which networks fulfil these 
ul functions and the side effects which that involves may 
riJ therefore be grounds for institutional (re)design: 
)o conscious attempts to influence the institutional 
to characteristics of networks. In other words: attempts to 
to change the sustainable set of rules which regulates the 
ni interactions between mutually dependent parties and 
rli their relative positions and interrelationships.
Forms of institutional design
Institutional design may aim at modifying existing 
in networks, linking different networks or promoting the 
od formation of new networks. •V
• • Modifying existing networks. Institutional design 
may be aimed at modifying the functioning of an 
existing network, for example because the raison 
d’etre of this network has been superseded by new 
developments, or because the negative side effects 
of the cooperation within the network are becoming 
increasingly apparent to the parties within the 
network and to its environment.
h  An example: the Green Front
This type of institutional design is used in attempts to 
) change the functioning of the agricultural network in the 
' Netherlands. This network is known as the Green Front.
I For decades around the middle of the previous century it 
I proved to be an extremely successful formula whereby the 
; agricultural sector worked in close cooperation with the
Dutch Ministry of Agriculture and the relevant 
parliamentary party specialists. In this network the 
problems of the sector were tackled effectively and the 
survival of this sector was assured. Eventually, however, 
this cooperative link became increasingly dysfunctional. 
Although in macro-economic terms there was no longer 
any support for the sector, the sector was only kept going 
thanks to the agricultural subsidies obtained by its 
powerful lobby. In addition, the sector’s negative 
environmental impact took on increasingly problematic 
forms (notably the manure surplus) without this being 
admitted by the network, let alone tackled. It was clear that 
changes to the network structure from outside would be 
needed to achieve this.
• Linking different networks. In our complex 
network society there is increasing interdepen­
dency between sectors and a strong dynamic, to 
which existing institutional arrangements and 
networks have no solutions. New problems often 
pervade existing networks and there is a need for 
innovative solutions which require the coordination 
of processes and activities in different networks. In 
addition to modifying the set of rules within a 
sector, institutional design may thus also aim at 
coordinating interactions between actors from 
different networks.
An example: interconnecting the water 
and building networks
An example of this form of institutional design are 
attempts to improve the coordination between the water 
authorities and the building sector in the Netherlands. As a 
result of the expanding building activities, the water 
authorities have ever-increasing difficulties in doing their 
job. One of the reasons is that in building activities hardly 
any account is taken of the consequences which these will 
have for the water authorities. For example, because so 
much of the Dutch surface has been built on, it because 
increasingly important that in building plans sufficient 
space is set aside for surplus water storage in such a wet 
country as the Netherlands. For the water authorities this 
means that they intend to adopt a more pro-active attitude. 
They want to be involved at an early stage in the planning 
of building activities, to ensure that these plans are tailored 
to the requirements which the water authorities have. This 
calls for a more integrated planning of building activities 
in which the building network and water network must be 
geared to one another. In order to achieve this, the sets of 
rules which apply in each of these networks must be 
coordinated. This requires institutional design.
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• The formation of new networks. Institutional 
design may also be aimed at the creation or 
strengthening of institutional rules in a situation in 
which these are relatively poorly developed or are 
not tailored to a specific problem area.
An example: the zinc case
This kind of institutional design may be aimed at 
furthering new interactions between parties who earlier did 
not were interrelated. An example is the development of 
Dutch government policy aimed at curbing zinc emissions 
from building materials to surface water in the framework 
of the policy aimed at improving water quality. This meant 
that zinc companies were confronted with a new policy 
which was specifically aimed at them and which they 
wanted to oppose. This created a new interaction pattem 
between the companies themselves and between them and 
a whole range of public authorities. Initially this resulted in 
antagonistic interactions. Ultimately, however, the mutual 
benefits of collaborative strategies became apparent. 
Investments in product innovations turned out to be able to 
unite the interests of both company and government. The 
absence of rules supporting the interaction between 
industry and government, however, rendered this transition 
tremendously difficult. Institutional design in this case 
could be aimed at stimulating network formation between 
the zinc companies and the authorities, in order to create 
the conditions for more effective interactions (Van Bueren 
-  Klijn -  Koppenjan, 2003).
Motives for institutional design
A number of motives for institutional design have 
already been touched upon above. Here we list what in 
our view are the most important motives.
• The functioning of existing networks is seen as 
ineffective, inefficient or undesirable. For example, 
the long waiting lists in the health care sector which 
cannot be eliminated even with additional financial 
resources. The pay-off rules within the network of 
the organisations involved are apparently 
constructed in such a way that more input does not 
result in more output. This may constitute a reason 
to attempt to modify this network (Kenis, 2001). 
The fraudulent practices surrounding tender 
procedures in the building industry in the 
Netherlands, recently brought to light by a 
parliamentary enquiry, likewise provides a reason 
for fundamental forms of institutional redesign. 
The long drawn out decision making surrounding 
major infrastructural projects that threaten to 
damage the Netherlands’ international competitive
position constitutes another argument in favour of 3c 
institutional design. The cause is seen as the far- 
reaching institutionalisation of numerous interests. .2 
The Not-In-My-Back-Yard behaviour of local Iß 
actors obstructs the realisation of national projects. .2 
Breaking down this local veto power through the si 
simplification of decision making procedures is 2t 
offered as a solution: forms of institutional Iß 
redesign. -
If existing networks do not appear able or prepared b: 
to deal effectively with new social problems or ic
challenges -  with the risk that these remain m
unaddressed or are tackled half-heartedly -  those sí 
who are responsible for tackling these problems or ic 
taking on these challenges will thus have grounds zl 
for developing initiatives for institutional design. .n 
These sort of initiatives may originate from within rr 
the network as well as from outside it. An example si 
is the environmental impacts or safety risks which 
are produced in various sectors, but are only dealt Jl 
with by the relevant sectors themselves with the si 
utmost difficulty.
Institutional design may also be driven by attempts zi 
to establish distributive advantages: attempts by y< 
parties within the network to establish temporary y 
shifts in power relations or chances to improve s 
their position by changing the institutional game si
rules for a longer period of time (Blom -  Hansen, ,n
1997; Moe, 1990; Knight, 1992).
Initiatives for institutional design may also be a ß 
reaction to controversial events, accidents or crisis, ,z
when it is not quite clear what has caused them but lu
where the opinion has taken root that they should bl 
not have happened and that the existing set of Ic 
organisations is obviously inadequate for ic
preventing events of this kind. In the Netherlands, ,z
the bursting of the dike in Wilnis as a result of the ai 
prolonged period of drought in the summer of 2003 £(
is a good example of this. Due to the absence of a ß 
central dike authority in the Netherlands, the water ie
authorities were unable to immediately come up qi
with information concerning the quality of 3c 
comparable dikes elsewhere in the country. A call 11 
immediately went up for the centralisation of the si 
water authority. In an ambiguous situation in which rl 
there is a lack of information regarding substantive & 
causes and solutions, proposals for institutional b 
changes offer a way out. They have a strongly y 
symbolic character: their effectiveness is uncertain, fr 
but enable public executives to demonstrate their 
decisiveness.
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• Institutional design proposals also develop as a 
result of learning behaviour and imitating what is 
happening in other countries: ‘spill-overs’ 
(Kingdon, 1984 -  1995), institutional transplants 
(De Jong, et al, 2002), management hypes 
(Abrahamson, 1991), etcetera. These may involve 
attempts to introduce into a specific network 
something that was successful elsewhere. These 
attempts may be motivated by the inclination to 
improve the functioning of the network. But they 
may also be inspired by the need of public 
executives and managers to strengthen their 
external legitimacy by showing that they know how 
to apply the latest insights and methods from the 
sphere of management and organisational methods 
to their own field. In addition to these professional 
motives, ideological motives may underlie the 
desire for institutional innovation. The widespread 
pursuit of privatisation and the promotion of the 
theories on new public management may be traced 
back to an important extent to this motive.
• Initiatives for institutional design may also be a 
reaction to decisions from higher authorities. An 
example of this might be decisions at European 
level on the liberalisation of the European markets. 
These decisions assume many new forms of 
institutional design by member states. For example, 
the striving for the privatisation and liberalisation 
of the transport sector and the electricity market in 
the Netherlands was inspired by European 
legislation. This does not mean, though, that these 
developments are predetermined. Member states 
are able to some extent to determine the pace and 
the form of the design. Thus it is possible to 
influence the direction and the pace of the 
development although it is very difficult to opt out 
of the development itself.
All in all, various motives may underlie initiatives 
for institutional design. Moreover, institutional design 
is a mixed-motive game: different parties each have 
their own reasons for making or supporting proposals 
for institutional design -  or thwarting them. Moreover, 
in the course of institutional design processes, these 
motives will change. Parties which initially saw a 
reason to oppose these initiatives may come around to 
the view that their opposition does not help and decide 
instead to influence the contents of the plans. Others 
may become involved during the course of the process 
and may perceive in the initiative opportunities for 
achieving their own objectives. Yet others may not 
become aware of the fact that the plans will damage
their interests until a late stage in the institutional 
design process at which point they suddenly decide to 
dig in their heels.
Institutional design strategies
Institutional design is thus first of all aimed at 
changing rules. To achieve this, however, highly 
diverse institutional design strategies are possible. In 
this section we will first look at the possible options 
for intervention available to institutional design: what 
type of rules (and thus network characteristics) are the 
interventions aimed at. Subsequently we look at the 
way in which the rules could be changed.
Directions of institutional design: which rules change 
Various management strategies may be 
distinguished which are based on the changing of 
rules. These strategies may be classified into three 
categories:
-  Strategies aimed at the network composition; these 
are strategies which focus on changing or 
influencing the composition of the network. Based 
on the premise that the composition of the network 
has an influence on the interactions occurring 
within it so that the resulting outcomes produce 
changes in the composition of the network and 
therefore different interaction patterns and 
outcomes. There are various ways in which the 
composition of the network may be changed. For 
example, strategies aimed at consolidating or 
changing actors’ positions or adding new actors. 
However, strategies may also be aimed at changing 
the access rules for actors or at influencing the 
network as a whole by promoting network 
formation, and self-regulation, or modifications to 
the system. Table 2 shows which sort of rules 
function as intervention points for each strategy.
-  Strategies aimed at the network outcomes; these are 
strategies, which try to influence the standards or 
the logic of costs and benefits in a sustainable way 
so that games within networks evolve in a different 
way because other strategic choices are made. The 
point of intervention here is thus not the actors as in 
the previous set of strategies but their choices. This 
means the sustainable influencing of actors’ 
strategic choices and the outcomes resulting from 
them. The most important institutional design 
strategies in this category are strategies to change 
the pay-off structure, to change professional codes
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and morals and strategies, which are aimed at 
changing evaluation criteria.
-  Strategies aimed at network interactions; these are 
strategies, which try to influence the interactions 
between actors in a sustainable way. These strategies 
are thus aimed at influencing rules, which regulate 
the process in networks and in this way try to 
facilitate interactions, to put them in a framework or 
to make linkages. Strategies in this category include 
developing conflict settlement mechanisms or 
introducing certain procedures into interactions. But 
strategies such as certification or influencing 
supervisory relationships also fall into this category.
Table 2 shows the dominant, most frequently 
occurring strategies and the sort of rules that are 
influenced via such a strategy. We use the same 
typology of rules that have been presented in section 2. 
There are two points that should be noted. The first is 
that in attempts to change rules in the network, a 
number of the strategies shown in the table are 
frequently used at the same time. The second is that the 
table indicates which types of rules are changed using 
a particular strategy. The ways in which this happens, 
however, may vary greatly. In short, the table provides 
an analytical overview of the various strategies for 
changing the rules in networks.
Example: changing actors and entry rules
One of the objectives of the Private Finance Initiative in the 
UK in the field of road contracting was the creation of a new 
industry of private actors who were going to deal with the 
construction, the operating and the financing of road 
construction projects. If we look at the first 8 major road 
construction projects which were contracted out in the latter 
part of the 1990s (projects which were completed in 1996), 
then it may be stated that new consortia were certainly 
created which also repeatedly bid for one of the projects. In 
total 11 consortia were involved in the 8 DFBO projects. Six 
of these consortia won at least one contract bid. The bidding 
procedure that is used works towards a situation in which 
two bidders remain. If we look at an overview of the remai­
ning two consortia and the winners and losers then we see 
that various consortia are mentioned a number of times, as 
winner or loser. Two consortia won twice. Moreover, in so­
me cases organisations were involved in different consortia. 
In subsequent contract negotiations these consortia also 
played an important role. Thus we see that although this 
intervention to change the game rules on the implementation 
of road facilities led to a mighty shake up in the network, 
after a while stabilisation once more occurs and a fairly 
settled group of players forms around the policy issue. In 
short, a (new) process of network formation once more 
begins to develop, surely because when entering into long­
term contracts (30 years!) long-term relations are also 
entered into between public and private actors. (Haynes/ 
Roden, 1999; Immers, 2001)
Table 2.
Strategies to influence and change rules in networks












1. change actor positions X
2. lay down actor positions (X) X
3. add actors (X) X
4. change access rules for games X
5. influence network formation (X) X
6. promote self-regulation X (X) (X) X
7. system m odifications 
(e.g. Market forces, reorganisations) X X (X) X X
Network outcomes
1. change evaluation criteria X (X)
2. influence pay-off structure (X) X
3. influence professional codes X (X)
Network interactions
1. conflict regulation (X) X
2. change interaction procedures (X) X
3. certification X X
4. change supervisory relationships (X) X X
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n\  Institutional design for changing of institutions: 
äi\ how does it happen
While we have shown above where institutional 
ab design strategies may be aimed there now follows the 
ini interesting question of how it may happen. In line with 
Iw what was said in section 2 about the changing of rules 
m  we may distinguish two important ways in which 
:ni institutional design strategies may be deployed:
-  -  Direct intervention in rules; interventions may be
aimed directly at changing rules. This is the case 
with, for example, legislation (or changes in 
legislation), but also when private agreements are 
entered into or, for instance, public-private 
covenants are entered into which have long-term 
time-frames. An example of a private agreement is 
that of the Tabaksblat commission in the 
Netherlands which has established rules on pay­
offs for top managers in response to the discussion 
on the ‘self-enrichment’ of managers via the 
provision of shares. In the USA, too, there is a 
discussion underway about sharper controls on 
companies in response to a series of fraud scandals, 
the most well-known of which is the fraud 
involving ENRON. Drawing up rules of this sort 
directly affects actors’ options for behaviour and 
regulates, for example, the method of information 
provision.
- -  Indirect interventions via the influencing of
perceptions and the creation of long-term changes 
in interaction patterns. If we assume that rules may 
also be changed as a result of actors changing their 
strategies, interpreting rules differently, or no 
longer following rules, institutional design 
strategies may also be aimed at bringing about 
sustainable changes to actors’ perceptions. We refer 
to this here as sustainable perception reframing. 
Reframing involves the bringing about of major 
changes in actors’ perceptions so that they interpret 
situations in a different way and (drastically) adjust 
their behaviour. Established habits and things that 
are taken for granted are thus broken down 
enabling new lines of behaviour' (and common 
practice regulated by rules).
Reframing strategies to initiate developments and 
ro create conditions for rule change may take shape in 
b different ways. For example, administrative stories 
n may be set up which pave the way for change. The 
18 story of ‘The Third Way’ as it is told by the Labour 
D Government in the UK is a good example of an V
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attempt at reframing via administrative stories. The 
Blair government wants to create a different picture of 
the future with regard to citizenship, reciprocity and 
the role of government. The story of ‘The Third Way’ 
was not just a way to help Labour into power once 
more, but also a sort of programme, a direction 
intended to set people and ideas in motion. It is also a 
story that highlights particular problems and 
propagates particular solutions. In this sense 
administrative stories, in common with other methods 
of reframing, provide a sort of focus for sensitizing 
concepts such as market forces, self-reliance, public- 
private cooperation. They point to a problem and focus 
attention on specific solutions. A concept such as self- 
reliance, for example, focuses attention on a specific 
formulation of the problem (there is too little distance 
between policy and implementation and this is why 
implementation ends up being inefficient) and 
proposes solutions (greater efficiency can be achieved 
through self-reliance). In short, reframing strategies 
such as administrative stories and sensitizing concepts, 
but also others such as discussing major policy 
documents or utilising crisis situations, aim to bring 
about sustainable changes in actors’ thinking and 
strategic behaviour and via this route in existing 
current patterns regulated through rules. Incidentally, 
reframing strategies are often used at the same time as 
direct interventions. Administrative stories thus form 
the supervision of concrete measures such as the self- 
reliance of sections of departments, the introduction of 
performance contracts, etc. In short, institutional 
design in networks is often a combination of direct 
interventions in rules and attempts to reframe. It will 
be clear that reframing in common with direct 
intervention in rules does not always result in clear-cut 
outcomes. A characteristic of reframing, after all, is 
that actors give their own interpretation to concepts 
and the accompanying steering attempts.
Example: Institutional rules and agencies
The introduction of agencies in the Dutch public sector, 
seen from the angle of the original objectives (to improve 
effectiveness and efficiency) certainly had an impact. One 
of the side effects, however, is an increasing self- 
awareness in a number of these newly formed agencies. 
They have now developed a whole range of external 
assessment mechanisms in which external clients pass 
judgement so that they are less dependent on the 
judgements of the parent department. This last was
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certainly not anticipated and leads to mixed feelings on the 
part of the parent departments (see Van Thiel, 2002). The 
concept of agencies and self-reliance is now being 
interpreted in a new way by the self-reliant services 
themselves, being accountable to stakeholders, who were 
not intended in the original concept. Thus reframing and 
the process of institutional design also appears to have its 
own dynamic and is formed and changed in the course of 
the interaction process itself.
The complex character of 
the institutional design process
Even though institutions are not static and are 
subject to continual change, they are not easy to 
influence via conscious design activities even though 
the discussion of various strategies in the former 
section may suggests such. If that were the case, then 
they would be continuously subject to attempts by 
actors to adapt them to their own advantage. It is 
precisely the stability of institutions which guarantees 
that they will be able to fulfil their function: to 
decrease uncertainty and to reduce transaction costs in 
order to facilitate cooperation (Goodin, 1986)
A number of causes of this stability may be defined:
• The stability of institutions derives first and 
foremost from the fact that they fall outside the 
direct sphere of influence of actors. This may be 
because the rules are based on formal decisions, 
which are taken by other actors in ‘higher’ arenas. 
Arenas that are not directly accessible to actors who 
dominate in the network (O’Toole, 1988; Kiser -  
Ostrom, 1982).
• Rules have gradually developed in a long history of 
repeated interaction and have become largely 
common practice. Actors are often not even aware 
of the institutional rules that they are following, let 
alone that they come up with the idea of changing 
them (Giddens, 1984; North, 1990).
• Furthermore, parties often have a vested interest in 
existing rules. Even if the rules mean that they lose 
in a concrete game, these same rules may guard 
them from greater loss or threats to their core 
values and survival. And they probably offer the 
prospect of future profit opportunities.
• Institutional innovations take the place of familiar 
institutional practices. Parties must institutionalise 
new roles and rules and must learn to deal with 
them in practice. This creates strategic uncertainty
and high interaction costs. Reasons for parties to 
cling to existing practices instead of making 
expensive investments in institutional innovations. 
• Finally, rules are shared constructions by actors 
which serve to substantially restrict their ability to 
be influenced by any party. If a party ignores or 
breaks a rule this is not sufficient to undermine the 
validity of the rule itself. This only happens if other 
parties go along with this. If they do not, the party 
which breaks the rule will be faced with the 
resultant costs (for example, in terms of reactions 
from other parties, which may include sanctions). 
In short, rules often cannot be changed unilaterally.
Institutional design as a bargaining 
game with garbage can-type characteristics
The insight that institutional design may be 
motivated by attempts to optimise collective benefits 
as well as to bring about distributional advantages is a 
first indication that institutional design is not an 
intellectual design activity, but the subject of a 
strategic game between actors (Blom -  Hansen, 1997). 
Institutional design is a negotiating game in which 
partisan players try to force decisions favourable to 
them or to influence decisions to their advantage.
The difference between institutional design and 
‘ordinary’ policy games within networks may be found 
in the fact the first is aimed at changing institutional 
rules. This usually assumes that certain legislative 
procedures and decision rules have to be followed, 
whereby actors who are dominant within a network 
may not automatically participate in this game. The 
complicated and lengthy procedures and uncertain 
institutional environment reduce the manageability of 
this game: it is a negotiation game in a garbage can- 
type context (Cohen -  March -  Olsen, 1972; March -  
Olsen, 1982, 1989; Allison, 1970).
The game that is played in institutional arenas, 
though, is not unrelated to the games which take place 
in policy networks. Some network actors will have 
easier access to institutional arenas than others. And 
some will be in a better position to organise a lobby to 
influence the decision making in this arena or to form 
a coalition with influential parties who operate in these 
arenas.
The game character of institutional design means 
that its outcomes are not rational designs. They are 
rather the result of the process of pushing and pulling 
between the parties involved that has taken place
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within them. Moreover, policy assumptions about the 
effectiveness of institutional designs play a role, but so 
do the power relations between conflicting coalitions 
and coincidence as a result of the institutional 
fragmented environment in which the game of 
institutional design is played.
The impact of formal decisions 
on concrete network situations
How formal decisions in institutional arenas aimed 
at changing network rules will work out exactly in 
practice is not fixed beforehand. After all, formal rules 
are not identical to the institutional rules-in-use within 
networks. Formal decisions may, in the short term, 
break down institutional practices, liquidate 
organisations, establish new ones, adjust resources and 
so forth. But that does not mean that a new 
institutional practice will immediately be established. 
Even if a fairly comprehensive institutional blueprint 
is introduced, in practice these new institutional rules 
will have to be internalised and operationalized via a 
process of trial and error. Given the unpredictability of 
strategic behaviour, a lot of unforeseen circumstances 
will arise which parties must leam to deal with. Laying 
down new institutional rules in as much detail as 
possible is not the solution: these must also be 
internalised and tailored to the practical situation. The 
paradox of increasing policy discretion comes into 
play here: more rules offer more opportunities to 
interpret them in one’s own way and thus increase the 
distance between formal rules and rules-in-use.
This sketch of the formation of institutional design 
shows that we are dealing with complex processes that 
are difficult to control (Goodin, 1986; North, 1990; 
Knight, 1992). Apart from the fact that attempts 
relating to institutional design develop in an 
institutional arena, where the pushing and pulling 
around the design leads to relatively unpredictable 
outcomes, these outcomes are subsequently converted 
into concrete policy games within network settings in 
new institutional practices (Kiser and Ostrom, 1982; 
Ostrom, 1986). See figure 1.
The complex, multi-level character of the 
institutional design game implies that the effects of 
these design attempts involve a high degree of 
uncertainty. The consequence is that designs are by 
definition imperfect and should be seen rather as the 
beginning of a scenario of institutional change than as 
a definitive design. The reactions which the change
Figure 1.
The complex multi-level character 
of the institutional design game
brings about are only predictable in part. The 
consequence is that unexpected and possibly undesired 
effects will occur which call for adaptation and thus 
for formal decisions which supplement or adjust the 
initial design. For example, attempts to liberalise 
public service provision when unexpected strategic 
reactions from the players involved restrict competi­
tion and endanger public interests so that new forms of 
regulation have to be introduced to cope with these 
effects. Again, institional design implies rather the 
starting of a protracted and undetermined process than 
the intellectual design of an institutional blue-print.
The direction of institutional design: 
what constitutes ‘good’ institutional designs?
From the normative starting point of the network 
approach, which means that in a complex network 
society there are increasing interdependencies between 
numerous social actors, sectors and domains whereby 
dealing with complicated problems and the realisation 
of projects or policies makes new forms of interaction 
necessary, the main objective of institutional design is 
the furtherance of cooperation. At the same time 
existing interaction patterns may no longer be 
functional and that existing institutional links need to 
be modified.
In addition, society imposes more and more 
requirements on forms of cooperation: passing on the 
costs of cooperation to society is becoming 
increasingly unacceptable. An growing number of 
interests needs to be taken account of and the mode of 
cooperation needs to be transparent and provide 
external accountability.
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This means that in any case the following
requirements may be imposed on institutional designs
(compare Goodin, 1986; Hood -  Jackson, 1991;
Kickert -  Klijn -  Koppenjan, 1997):
1. They must have a high degree of stability or 
robustness. If institutions can easily be modified by 
parties, they will become the focus of conflict in 
attempts to gain distributive advantages. 
Institutions should be conflict-proof and have 
sufficient robustness to continue to function in 
turbulent times -  for example, in periods of conflict 
and crises. It is precisely due to their stability that 
institutions contribute to the reduction in strategic 
uncertainty and transaction costs thus enabling 
interaction.
2. Institutions only work if they are accepted and 
internalised by the parties involved. In existing 
institutions this is often brought about via a long 
history of repeated interactions. In designed 
institutions the great challenge is to bring about this 
‘goodness to fit’. This imposes requirements on 
both the content of institutions and the way in 
which they are introduced in practice.
3. Institutions must comprise facilities which enable 
them to actually support interaction: this places 
substantive requirements on sets of rules that are 
introduced. These must meet the most important 
strategic challenges which are addressed in the 
interaction they want to support. It may be expected 
that sets of rules will contain the various types of 
rules dealt with in Section 2 and that these rules 
will have to interrelate in a more or less consistent 
manner.
4. Network institutions should also have what Goodin 
calls a „sensitivity to motivational complexity” 
(Goodin, 1986). Precisely because in the interac­
tion in network situations a variety of interests is at 
issue and cooperation is aimed at bringing about 
integration between these interests, institutions 
need to do justice to this plurality of values and 
interests. Institutional design aimed at solving a 
specific problem or prioritising a particular interest 
thus conflicts with this insight.
5. Given the uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of 
institutional designs, and the fact that institutional 
innovations take the place of existing institutions 
which, once replaced, can no longer be fallen back 
on, prudence is desirable. This argues in favour of 
incremental institutional modifications rather than
grand designs, opportunities to try out different 
institutional practices alongside each other, and 
efforts to avoid irreversible modifications as far as 
possible. The opportunities for this in practice are 
limited, though: precisely because in practice 
institutional modifications come up against a lot of 
resistance, there is a tendency to take irreversible 
steps (Koppenjan, 2001). And allowing institutio­
nal regimes to exist alongside each other is at the 
cost of the reduction of strategic uncertainty and 
often imposes excessive demands on the resources 
and strategic capacity of the organisations invo­
lved.
6. Finally, there are the requirements of transparency, 
openness and accountability which may be placed 
on institutional design. Formal rules are often 
aimed at bringing these about. At the same time 
there is a risk that they will lead to a whole range of 
forms of bureaucracy which may increase trans­
action costs and hinder the possibilities for 
innovative forms of cooperation, and have little to 
do with the actual rules-in-use and the policy 
games which take place behind them.
Although making no pretensions to completeness, 
the above-mentioned criteria show the requirements 
that good institutional design should meet. In order to 
determine to which specific sets of rules these 
requirements should lead in concrete network 
situations, more insight is needed into the nature and 
functioning of institutional rules. It is to be expected 
that there will be no ‘one best soluticrti’ because it 
conflicts with the ‘goodness to fit’ requirement among 
other things. The remarks made above show that it will 
not always be easy to meet all the criteria mentioned at 
the same time and that trade-offs will be necessary.
Conclusion:
institutional design as subject of research
Institutional design would appear to be right in the 
spotlight at the moment judging by the numerous 
examples that can be found in the western world. 
Agencies, new forms of decision making, system 
reforms, and partnerships are all policy initiatives 
which to a greater or lesser extent assume institutional 
design in and of networks.
Tinkering with the institutional characteristics of 
networks, however, is not a simple task as we have
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ia shown in this paper. Not only are the strategies 
rfl themselves often not entirely clear but they must be 
ni implemented in a context in which other actors also 
ni interpret such changes and must accept and deal with 
ril them. In short, institutional design is a process of 
jq pushing and pulling with uncertain results. Moreover, 
ol long-established certainties which have proved their 
3V value in the past are messed about with while no-one 
dI knows for sure what will replace them. These 
lu uncertainties, however, in no way restrain politicians 
ia and policy makers since proposals for institutional 
3b design are made in the media on a daily basis.
There is in short every reason to devote more 
1b attention, both theoretical and empirical, to this 
U2 subject. Although various attempts have already been 
m made on this front (e.g. Polliit -  Bouckaert, 2000) the 
si research into institutional design is still in its infancy, 
ni In this paper we have presented a theoretical 
;il framework which could be used to conduct research 
ni into institutional design interventions. By applying the 
yj types of rules and interventions, institutional design 
la strategies could be compared and analysed. Using the 
f i t  theoretical insights on the way in which institutional 
)b design is deployed and its motives clarified, the 
la effects of institutional design could be mapped. This 
33 could be done by mapping the specific path of changes 
m initiated by institutional design strategies, but also by 
}2 specifying the conditions under which the path is 
it travelled. At the same time, the effects of the 
ni institutional design strategies which have been set in 
it train should be looked into. Research of this sort 
w would give us more insight into the possibilities, 
il limitations and pitfalls of institutional design in 
>n networks.
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